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SECURITIES REGULATION: THE VOTING SWITCH
CONDITION IN A PERMIT TO ISSUE SECURITIES
By CHARLES L. GLADSON*
WHEN the Commissioner of Corporations of California issues a
permit for the sale of securities,' he may impose a condition in the
permit which provides:'
[T]he holders of the promotional securities as a group shall grant
an irrevocable power of attorney or proxy to the holders of the other
outstanding stock which shall entitle said holders as a group to elect a
majority of the board of directors upon a default in payment of divi-
dends (cash, property or stock) at the rate of five percent per annum
on the selling price of such outstanding stock in an amount of two
years' dividends at said rate.
This device, popularly termed "the voting switch condition," was
added to the Commissioner's list of securities regulations in 1956,
presumably under the authority granted to him by the Corporate Secu-
rities Act 3  Section 25508 of the act states in part: "The Commis-
sioner may impose conditions . . . he deems reasonable and neces-
sary or advisable for the protection of the public and the purchasers
of the securities. '
Although this section delegates to the Commissioner a great deal
of discretion,5 does it include within its broad purview the power to
restrict the voting rights of corporate stockholders by administrative
regulations such as the voting switch condition?
Application and Effect
The condition appears on its face to be a regulation devised by the
Commissioner to subordinate the voting rights of the incorporators,
who have been issued true promotional stock' for little, if any, tangible
*Member, Third Year class.
1 CAL. CORP. CODE § 25507.
2 10 CAL. ADmi. CODE § 373.
'CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25500-26104.
' CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25508.
'The Uniform Securities Act, Final Report of the Assembly Interim Committee on
Judiciary-Civil, 23 INT. COMm. REP. No. 2., 7,8.
' Promotional stock is that issued at the outset to the original promotors of the corpora-
ton, who are defined in BALLANTINE, CoRtoRATioNs § 35, p. 101 (Rev. ed. 1946) as "those
who undertake to form a corporation and procure for it rights . and capital by which to
carry out the purposes set forth in the charter."
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consideration, in order to protect the investing public against fraud,
inefficient management or overly speculative securities. However,
the Commissioner has gone much further than merely subordinating
the voting rights of true promotional shareholders. A specific example
would be the Commissioner's treatment of any stock purchased by close
corporation insiders, for a monetary consideration lower than the
consideration for which securities are to be subsequently sold to the
public, as similar to promotional stock and thus subject to the voting
switch condition.7 The burden this places upon the legitimate close
corporation seeking a permit to issue stock to the public in order to
finance corporate growth can be readily seen. The insiders, who own
all of the presently outstanding capital stock of the corporation (paid
for with cash at par value), must submit to the voting switch condition
if the new offer is to be priced above par because the Commissioner
can refuse to issue the permit without it.' If, through depression, war,
or act of God, the corporation is unable to meet its required dividend
payments to the minority public stockholder group, then the insiders
automatically lose their right, as majority stockholders, to vote for and
elect the board of directors. As other methods of financing are often
impractical or impossible, the voting switch condition must be accepted
if a permit is to be obtained with the consequent risk of loss of voting
rights.
Validity of the Condition
While there is no express limitation in the Corporate Securities Act
on the conditions which may be imposed by the Commissioner,1"
there is a judicial limitation on his power in this respect which was
established in Agnew v. Dougherty.1" The court held that the terms
and conditions to be imposed in a permit must not be such as would
create a greater burden than is consistent with safety and security.
Whether the voting switch condition is such a burden as to exceed the
10 CAL. ADI. CODE § 368: "Securities issued for services rendered, patents. copyrights
or other intangible considerations, the value of which has not been established to the satis-
faction of the Commissioner by means such as an established earning record, or which are
issued for a monetary consideration substantially lower than the consideration for which
securities are sold for principle financing purposes, ordinarily will be treated as promotion.
The amount of promotion will be determined by facts and circumstances in each particular
application."
'CAL. CORP. CODE § 25500. See ADViSING CALIFORNIA BUSINESs ENTERPRISES §§ 7, 8,
pp. 503, 504 (Cont. Ed. Bar 1958).
10 CAL. ADm. CODE § 373.
'o Otten v. Riesener Chocolate Co., 82 Cal. App. 83, 254 Pac. 942 (1927).
189 Cal. 446, 209 Pac. 34 (1922).
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Commissioner's authority is open to speculation, for the courts have
not as yet been called upon to rule on its validity. The courts have, how-
ever, held invalid conditions which appear to be very similar in sub-
stance and effect.
In National Concentrator Co. v. Eccleston'2 the Commissioner bad
imposed a condition in a permit requiring Eccleston, a prospective
stockholder, to agree to waive his right to vote for and elect members
of the board of directors, although he would hold an overwhelming
majority of the stock in the corporation once the permit was issued
and the stock purchased. The condition was imposed because the con-
sideration given for the stock was a patent, of great but intangible
value, thus treated by the Commissioner as if it were promotional
stock. 3 Eccleston complied with the condition, executed a voting waiver
agreement and was not allowed to vote his shares at the next share-
holders' meeting. The question presented involved the Commissioner's
power to impose the condition. The court held that the condition was
invalid and stated that the voting of stock was a valid, constitutional
right of a stockholder and that the underlying reason for the imposition
of conditions by the Corporations Commissioner was to safeguard the
public against fraud in the issuance of stock, not to prohibit legitimate
business or suppress the exercise by an individual of his constitutional
rights. The court in National Concentrator reiterated the proposition
laid down in the leading case of In Re Dart'4 to the effect that the power
of an administrator to pass reasonable regulation bears no relationship
to the power to prohibit and suppress.
In Film Producers Inc. v. Jordan'5 the right of a stockholder in
California to vote for the board of directors was held to be fundamental,
a point also made in National Concentrator. In Mayberg v. Superior
Court it was held that the voting rights of shareholders in a corpora-
tion were an incident of property ownership and could not be inter-
fered with; and in Los Angeles v. Owens River Canal Co.' the denial
of a stockholder's right to vote his stock was ruled grounds for an
injunction restraining interference with this property right.
It appears from a review of National Concentrator, and the other
cases just mentioned, that the right to vote stock, which is non-promo-
122 Cal. App. 698, 10 P.2d 1033 (1932).
1110 CAL. ADM. CODE § 368. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
14 172 Cal. 47, 155 Pac. 63 (1916).
171 Cal. 664, 154 Pac. 605 (1916).
1 19 Cal. 2d 336, 341, 121 P.2d 688 (1942).
" 120 Cal. App. 380, 7 P. 2d 1064 (1932).
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tional in a true sense, is fundamental, and that it is not within the Com-
missioner's power to prohibit a stockholder's exercise of such right.
It also appears that the Commissioner's interference with voting rights
of a stockholder is beyond his power because it tends to prohibit legiti-
mate business rather than to protect the public against fraud.
While National Concentrator has never been overruled by the Cali-
fornia courts, it is arguable whether it is as authoritative today as when
decided. It must be remembered that the decision was based in part
on the theory that the rights of a stockholder to vote for the board of
directors was a constitutional right. Subsequently, the applicable
section of the Constitution of California"8 was repealed in order to
remove limitations on powers granted in other sections of the consti-
tution, thus extinguishing the constitutional basis for the right to vote
shares of stock. Shortly thereafter, however, the legislature enacted
a slightly modified, though similar, version of the constitutional provi-
sion into the Corporations Code. 9 The legislative guarantee was more
flexible, providing that a stockholder would still have the right to vote
his shares, subject to contrary provisions in the articles of incorporation
or in a statute relating to the election of directors. Analyzing the code
section, it seems that the voting right can now be taken away, but only
by provisions in the articles of incorporation or by legislative enactment
on stockholder voting rights.2 ° It is to be noted that there is no Cali-
fornia statute providing for administrative authority to deprive a
majority stockholder of his right to vote at an election of members of
the board of directors, nor does section 2215 of the Corporations Code
provide that voting rights may be taken away by administrative action.
Thus, it must follow that the rule in National Concentrator is still the
law in California as to the validity of an administrative regulation
depriving a stockholder of his right to vote, as does the voting switch
condition when used.
8 CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 12: "In all elections for directors or managers of a corpora-
tion, every stockholder shall have the right to vote, in person or by proxy, the number of
shares of stock owned by him, for as many persons as there are directurs or managers to be
elected . . . and such directors or managers shall not be elected in any other manner.
(Italics added.)
"9 CAL. CoRn'. CODE § 2215: "Subject to the provisions of sections 2218 to 2223, inclusive,
only persons in whose names shares entitled to vote stand on the stock records of the corpo-
ration . . . are entitled to vote at the meeting. In the absence of any contrary provision in
the articles or in any statute relating to the election of the directors, each such person is
entitled to one vote for each share." (Italics added.) Compare with language of CAL.
CONST. art. VII, § 12 note 18 supra.
2' See text of CAL. CoRn. CODE § 2215 note 19 supra.
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Another voting right safeguard is to be found in section 1100 of
the Corporations Code which provides that: " . . . all shares of any
one class or series of stock must have the same voting rights." If only
a portion of the authorized capital stock of the close corporation were
to be purchased at par initially by insiders, it is entirely probable that
the voting switch condition would be imposed by the Commissioner in
an amended permit to issue the remaining authorized shares to the
public at a price above par. As all of the outstanding shares will be
of one class and series, the majority insider group would not have the
same voting rights as the minority public group. Thus, apparently, there
would be a violation of another code provision, substituted by the legis-
lature for the repealed constitutional guarantee which was partly relied
upon by the court in National Concentrator.
It may be argued that the condition in National Concentrator can
be factually distinguished from the voting switch condition. The
former condition simply required an agreement to waive the right
of the stockholders to vote; but the voting switch condition requires an
agreement giving an irrevocable proxy by the majority stockholders
to the minority group.2 However, under careful scrutiny this differ-
ence appears to be one of form rather than substance; for in both cases
a stockholder, or a group of stockholders, can be deprived of their
rights to vote for the board of directors. In one case the stock simply
can not be voted;22 in the other it can not be voted by the owner who
otherwise has the right to vote it, if the condition is applied.2" In both
cases, we have an agreement waiving the voting right. In National Con-
centrator the court held that the agreement waiving the voting right did
not forfeit the right because the agreement was compelled under a void
order of the Commissioner. This rule seems equally applicable to
the compelled agreement in the voting switch condition.
Enforceability of the Proxy Provision
An irrevocable proxy agreement is required of the majority stock-
holder group under terms of the condition. Some doubt can be raised
as to the enforceability of this agreement in view of certain provisions
of the Corporations Code. In California, unless a proxy is coupled
with an interest, and unless such is stated on the face of the proxy,
the proxy holder's power to vote is automatically revoked if the owner
of the shares is present at the stockholders' meeting and elects to vote
21 10 CAL. ADm. CODE § 373.
"2 National Concentrator v. Eccleston, 122 Cal. App. 698, 10 P.2d 1033 (1932).
" 10 CAL. ADA. CODE § 373.
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in person. 24  Also, under general principles of agency, the fact that
the proxy reads on its face that it is irrevocable has no effect and can
be revoked at will unless it is a power coupled with an interest. 25 An
interest, within the meaning of this rule, is created when the proxy is
given to secure creditors of the corporation, or as a basis for a change
of a property right, or when joined with the power to sell the stock.26
In the voting switch condition, the proxy is given under the compelled
agreement, after the condition is executed, to the minority stockholders
who are neither creditors of the corporation nor holders of any prop-
erty right whatever in the stock owned by the majority stockholder
group. Thus, there is clearly no proxy coupled with an interest within
the meaning of the rule. Also, in California, a proxy is not valid
after eleven months unless a longer period is specified. 21 In Dougherty
v. Cross2s the court held that even an agreement to give a proxy was
invalid after eleven months where no longer period was specified.
Applying these rules by analogy, it appears that the agreement to give
an irrevocable proxy, which is required by the voting switch condition,29
could be by-passed either by revocation of the proxy,3" or expiration
of the eleven month period,3' thus making the agreement unenforceable.
The underlying policy reason for the passage of the Corporate Secu-
rities Act was to protect the public against the perpetration of acts of
fraud in the issuance and sale of securities.32 Its sole purpose was to
disclose and uncover the acts of fraud, not to prohibit legitimate
business or suppress the exercise by an individual of valid rights.3
It is recognized that the Commissioner of Corporations must have some
latitude in order to carry out his duties effectively. But, we have seen
that the voting switch condition appears to operate outside of the provi-
sions of section 2215 of the Corporations Code in that it takes away
voting rights of stockholders through administrative regulation when
", CAL. CORP. CODE § 2228. See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 108, p. 263 (Rev. Ed.
1946) ; Comment, 36 Calif. L. Rev. 281 (1948) ; ADVISING CALIFORNIA BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
§ 6, p. 407 (Cont. Ed. Bar 1958).
"5 See annot. 159 A.L.R. 307 (1945) ; 3 WITKIN, SU3IM . CAL. LAW, Corporations § 87,
p. 2379 (1960).
" Annot. 159 A.L.R. 307, 308 (1945).
27 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2226.
"865 Cal. App. 2d 687, 151 P.2d 654 (1944).
2 10 CAL. ADM. CODE § 373.
20 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2228. See annot. 159 A.L.R. 307 (1945).
"' CAL. CORP. CODE § 2226.
'2 In Re Hatch, 10 Cal. 2d 147, 73 P.2d 885 (1937). See annot. 87 A.L.R. 42 (1933)
annot. 163 A.L.R. 1051 (1946).
"' Dougherty v. Riley. 1 Cal. 2d 298, 34 P.2d 1005 (1934).
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the legislature has declared that such rights can only be taken away by
statute or by the articles of incorporation. In 1932 an almost identical
condition in a permit was held invalid in the National Concentrator
case on the ground that it prohibited business and deprived the stock-
holder of his rights. In addition, the court in Agnew v. Dougherty4
laid down a general guideline for the Commissioner, which, in effect,
was not to create a greater burden on business by the exercise of his
power than is necessary to protect the public.
Conclusion
While it appears upon analysis that the voting switch condition not
only exceeds the Agnew limitation, but also conflicts with the voting
rights sections of the Corporations Code 5 and the rule laid down in
National Concentrator, nevertheless judicial decisions are not to be
understood as having been formulated in a vacuum. Rather, they are
developed to meet socio-economic requirements which vary from time
to time. Thus, it is entirely possible that a liberal court will uphold
the voting switch as a reasonable condition within the broad purview
of section 25508 of the Corporations Code"0 and necessary to pro-
tect today's investing public in a more complex economic climate
than existed at the time of the National Concentrator decision. Indeed,
one recent California decision, Western Airlines v. Sobieski,"7 can be
cited as an example of such a present liberal approach in this area.
The lesson to be gained from this important decision is that the courts
are now willing to go quite far in upholding expansion of the Com-
missioner's regulatory powers. However, if the voting switch condition
is to be upheld, a liberal interpretation of the voting rights sections
of the Corporations Code,3" and an overruling of National Concentrator
will first be required.
" 189 Cal. 446, 209 Pac. 34 (1922).
" CAL. CoRP. CODE §§ 1100, 2215.
o This is the only limiting provision which section 25508 of the Corporations Code
places on the Commissioner's power.
" 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961).
" CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1100, 2215.
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